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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRYSTAL LIME AND CEMENT 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS and HAR-
RIET J. K. ROBBINS, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8948 
PETITIOJ\ OF RESPONDENTS AND 
DEFE~DANTS FOR RE-HEARING 
TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH: 
Golden W. Robbins and Harriet .J. K. Robbins, de-
fendants and respondents, request a re-hearing in the 
above entitled cause upon the following grounds: 
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I 
The Supreme Court erroneously and inadvertantly 
stated that respondents in their counterclaim asked for 
reimbursement. 
"That in the event title was not quieted in 
them, that appellant herein be required to reim-
burse them the amount they expended for taxes." 
II 
The Supreme Court did not take into consideration 
the fact that it had become the law of the case that re-
spondents were not entitled to recover on their counter-
claim, and the counterclaim was not part of the case when 
ren1anded to the District Court. 
III 
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial 
court on grounds and argun1ents not presented in appel-
lant's Brief. 
IV 
The Supre1ne Court, b)~ judicial decision, has ren-
dered Rule 41 (b) n1eaningless. 
v 
This decision is eontrary to the law laid down by 
this court in previous tax title cases, without specifically 
overruling those cases. 
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VI 
Respondents could not obtain the relief to which they 
were entitled and their only remedy was to ask for a 
dismissal. 
VII 
By the decision this court has for the second time 
directed the lower eourt to do that which this court here-
tofore ordered, which order was carried out by the lower 
court but not complied with by appellant. 
VIII 
The Supreme Court has substituted its discretion for 
the discretion of the trial court. 
The respondents respectfully submit that as to all 
and each of the above grounds, the mistake and error 
of the court was decisive in resulting in the decision re-
versing the order of the trial court and resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice. 
MILTON v. BACKMAN 
wILLIAM H. HENDERSON 
GoLDEN W. RoBBINS 
Attorneys for the Respondents 
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We, Milton V. Backman, William H. Henderson, 
and Golden W. Robbins do hereby certify that we are the 
attorneys for the defendants and respondents, petitioners 
in the above entitled action. That we have carefully 
examined the decision herein and in our opinion there is 
good reason to believe that the judgment is erroneous 
and should be re-examined. 
ll2~--r~· /)t(~IJI -----------/~--------------~ 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRONEOUSLY AND INAD-
VER'l'ANTLY STATED THAT RESPONDENTS IN THEIR 
COUNTERCLAIM ASKED FOR REIMBURSEMENT: 
"THAT IN THE EVENT TITLE WAS NOT 
QUIETED IN THEM, THAT APPELLANT HEREIN 
BE REQUIRED TO REIMBURSE THEM THE 
AMOUNT THEY EXPENDED FOR TAXES." 
The Supreme Court erroneously and inadvertantly 
stated that Respondents in their counterclaim asked, 
"That in the event title was not quieted in 
them, that appellant herein be required to reim-
burse them the amount they expended for taxes." 
From an examination of the pleadings it will appear 
there is no such allegation in any of respondents' plead-
Ings. 
The inadvertance and error in saying that respond-
ents asked for reimbursernent is decisively important in 
the court's decision reversing the trial court. 
Not only is the above quotation from the court's opin-
ion an erroneous statement of the fact, but the implica-
tion from the quotation that reimbursernent is properly 
a subject of counterclain1 is directly in conflict with 
numerous V tah cases, holding that reirnbursernent is 
part of the relief that will be administered by the l'ourt 
as a condition precedent to quieting title in plaintiff. 
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Reimbursement is sometimes considered as part of 
plaintiff's complaint. In any event, it is a condition im-
posed before any relief is granted to plaintiff, and a con-
dition to plaintiff's right to relief. 
The defendant could not maintain an action either 
in law or equity to collect the taxes paid. It is so held 
in the case of Reeve v. Blatchley, 106 L. 259, 147 P. 2d 861 
and on page 862, bottom of the 2nd column, we quote: 
"The right to reimbursement for taxes paid 
does not exist at law, even in favor of the original 
tax title purchaser, Anson v. Ellison, L"tah, 140 
P. 2d 653: 37 Cyc. 1537; Colley on Taxation, 4th 
Ed., Sec. 1553, and cases there cited. But in equity 
this right in the original purchaser has been rec-
ognized to a limited extent. Cases cited supra. 
See also Holland v. I-Iotchkiss, 162 Cal. 366, 123 
P. 258, L.R. A. 1915C. -19:2, and annotation thereto. 
An original action will not lie in equity~ any more 
than in law, to collect such payment or to impress 
a lien on the property therefor. Anson v. Ellison, 
supra; 26 R.C.L. p. 463: Joliet Stove \Yks. v. Kiep, 
230 Ill. 530. s;~ X.E. S/5. 1:2 Ann. Cas. 221 and 
note; Colley on Taxation, Yol. -t Sec. 1553 and 
1556, -1-th Ed .. and ea~es cited. Greenwood v. 
Admns, SO Cal. 1-t :21 P. 113-1. But son1e courts 
of equity. this jurisdiction anwng then1, have held 
that they will )lOt quiet the owner's title until he 
reimhnr~P~ f11e other party for the taxes paid by 
him. Bolognese v. ~\ndPrson. supra: Anson v. 
Ellison, ~upra. Thi~ i~ upon the basis that he who 
~PPk~ equity nmst do t'qnity.'' 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"This is further evidenced by the fact that 
if the owner refuses to reimburse the tax title 
claimant, the court does not quiet title in claimant, 
nor does it enter a judgment for the amount in his 
favor. The court just refuses its decree in favor 
of the owner, and leaves the parties where it 
found them." 
And further on page 866 the court holds that there 
is no lien and we quote as follows: 
"From what has been said it follows that the 
tax title claimant, Miller, does not acquire a lien 
on the property, for the rnonies he paid to remove 
the county's tax lien, and the court was in error 
in declaring a lien and ordering a sale of the prop-
erty to satisfy the same; it alsQ follows that the 
court should not enter the decree quieting title in 
the owners (Reeve et al.) until they repay to 
Miller the full amount paid to the county on ac-
count of its tax claims, with interest." 
We particularly think that the court inadvertantly 
overlooked this fact because the court cited the above 
quoted case of Reeve v. Blatchley, in its opinion. 
It is apparent from the language in the case of 
Bolognese v. Anderson, 49 P. 2d 1034, 87 Utah 455, that 
this court considered reimbursement as rnore a part of 
plaintiff's cause of action and certainly was not even 
an affirmative defense. We quote from page 1035 of 
the Pacific Reporter : 
"We did not mean in that opinion to lay down 
any rule which would or would not require an 
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allegation and a proffer of the taxes by any party 
asking to have title quieted in him as against a 
person claiming title by virtue of a tax deed,· 
whether such party be a plaintiff or a defendant. 
That n1atter may well be taken care of by a court 
of equity if it detennines that the holder of the 
tax title has not a good title and that the other 
party is the real owner, by, as a matter of equity 
in proper cases, requiring the real owner to pay 
the holder of the invalid tax deed the amount of 
taxes with interest and penalties which he has 
paid, or the amount of taxes together with inter-
est and penalties which may have been due to the 
county. It \Yas thus held in Oregon Short Line 
R. Co. v. Hallock, 41 Utah 378, 126 P. 394." 
The case of F.isher ~·. Wright, 123 P. 2d 703, 101 
r tah 469, is one in which an action was brought to fore-
close a tax lien, and the court held that there was no tax 
lien. On the botton1 of page ·706 2nd Column and at the 
top of page 707 the court says : 
'•The ea:5e of Shipp v. Sheffield, ITtal1, 117 
P. 2d 996, 997, does not hold that the purchaser 
has a lien. It 1nerelv states : 'In so far as an' tax 
liens rnav Pxist. i{ there are anY,' etc. (italics 
added), t1nls }paving the matter u1~decided and in 
doubt. rrhe Shipp ease holds that Fisher, if he 
eoncludes to eease paying taxes. cannot, there-
fore, requirP payment of that which he has paid, 
atrainst the '\Yrig·hts or their g-rantees. If he con-el~tdP~ to e<.mtin~Ie to pay ta~es he 1nay have to 
wait indefinite!~· for the 'y rights again to be-
('.ollH' thP HC'tor~ a~ tlH':'-. were in the previous suit. 
IIi~ dilemma is JWrplexing but we are unable to 
help hint. ~or C'an the fad that the ";rights stipu-
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lated that he could foreclose 'his lien on said lands, 
for the taxes in the 1nanner provided by law,' help 
him when he has no lien to foreclose nor any 
manner provided by law for foreclosing a lien 
which does not exist." 
The above case shows that there is no tax lien. It 
also shows the position that the respondent was put in. 
And it shows why Rule 41 (b) should be invoked. 
Under these cases the respondent did not have a lien, 
did not have any affirmative act he could do other than 
to ask for a dismissal. 
POINT II 
THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO CON-
SIDERATION THAT IT HAD BECOME THE LAW OF THE 
CASE THAT RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO 
RECOVER ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM, AND THE .CO UN-
TERCLAIM WAS NOT PART OF THE CASE WHEN RE-
MANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The court says at the top of page 3 of its opinion: 
"Respondents' contentions might be very per-
suasive if they had not filed counterclaim in the 
action asking that title be quieted in them." 
The court is correct in saying that a counterclain1 
was filed in the action, but the counterclaim was elimi-
nated by the decision of the District Court and by the 
decision of the Supre1ne Court. The only thing remanded 
to the District Court for further proceedings was to 
quiet title in appellant subject to its reimbursing the 
respondents which appellant did not do. rrhe ('Olllltt'l'-
claim was eliminated by the two decisions. 
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POINT III 
THE SUPREME COURT REVERSED THE ORDER OF 
THE TRIAL COURT ON GROUNDS AND ARGUMENT NOT 
PRESENTED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
In the case at bar, this court in reversing the trial 
court, ruled against "respondents' contention that the 
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing, with 
prejudice, appellant's action under the provisions of 
Rule 41 (b)," stating: 
"Respondent's contentions might be very per-
suasive if they had not filed counter-claims in the 
action, asking that title be quieted in them, and 
also asking that in the event title ·was not quieted 
in them, that Appellant herein be required to re-
imburse them the amounts they expended for 
taxes. In asking for such affirmative relief, they 
were in effect, cross complainants in the action." 
Respondents have searched and re-searched Appel-
lant's Brief, and cannot find where Appellant made this 
point or argument. It appears that the point was volun-
teered by the court. 
It is a cardinal principle of appellate jurisdiction, 
everywhere recognizt>d, that an appellate court will not 
search the record and undertake to inYestigate and dis-
cover error upon whieh to rPYl~r~e the decision of the 
trial court. All intendn1ents are in favor of the trial 
court's judg1nent, :lnd the burden is upon an appellant 
to point out ~ueh PtTor in it~ lwid·~ upon which it believes 
the appellatP court must reverse the trial court. 
10 
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5 O.J.S. Sec. 1803, page 1230 
"The appellate court will not examine the 
record in a search for prejudicial errors which 
are not clearly pointed out and insisted on in the 
brief of the complaining party, and all such errors 
may be considered as waived." 
3 Am. Juris., page 330, Sec. 764, et seq. 
This court has consistently adhered to this principle. 
8andall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093, 1095, 
15 A.L.R. 620. 
"Many other errors are assigned, but they 
are not referred to in appellant's brief; others 
are argued in the brief but were not assigned; 
others raise questions not presented in the court 
below; and, finally, others allege insufficiency of 
the evidence to authorize a modification of the 
decree without specifying the particulars wherein 
the evidence is insufficient and without incorpo-
rating any of the evidence in the record. 
Such omissions and commissions on the part 
of appellant are in disregard of the rules of prac-
tice of this court and have been condemned by 
the decisions of the court in every case with which 
we are familiar wherein the objection has been 
seasonably made and relied on. To cite all the 
cases so holding would require more space than 
ought to be accorded an entire opinion in an 
ordinary case. We cite a few, however, as a gentle 
reminder: Walker v. Cont. Ins. Co., 2 Utah 331; 
People v. Peacock, 5 Utah 237, 14 Pac. 332; Herri-
man Irr .. Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 Pac. 719; 
11 
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Warren v. Robinson et al., 25 Utah 205, 70 Pac. 
989; Beatty v. Shelly, ±2 Utah 593, 132 Pac. 1160; 
Egelund v. Fayter, and cases cited, 51 Utah 579, 
172 Pac. 313; I-Iolt v. Great Eastern Casualty Co., 
173 Pac. 1168." 
See also Aikens v. Les Taylor Motor Co., 171 P. 2d 
page 676, 678, 110 U. 265, and Felkner v. Smith, 296 P. 
776, 77 U. 410, Headnote 3, 7 4 A.L.R. 124. 
The reason for the rule is aptly stated in 3 Am. Juris 
P. 333, Sec. 770. 
"Such 'a rule is not made for the pupose, alone, 
of enabling the court easily and readily to appre-
ciate and understand the errors complained of, 
but for the larger reason of enabling counsel 
on the other side to know what points are relied 
on, and what is urged as error 1·n the action of 
the co·urt." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Respondents request an opportunity to answer the 
point. Appellant is represented by able counsel, thoro-
ughly familiar with the record who would 1nost certain-
ly have advanced the point had they considered it had 
merit. We respectfully sub1nit that advance1nent and re-
liance of the point by tllis court was by inadvertance. 
The limitations of tin1e on petitions for rehearing do not 
pennit full argtunent on the lack of 1nerit on the point, 
but the other grounds for rehearing, herein urged, clearly 
indi<'a te it. Further, re~polHient~ sub1nit, after re1nittiture 
it was appellaut's action and complaiut upon which 
judgment \Yas rendered. A~ herein aboYe stated, there 
was no counterclain1 h~~ rP~pondPnt~ for reiinburseinent, 
as reimburse1nent i~ not a subjeet of counterclain1, but 
12 
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1s part of the limitations of the plaintiff's cause. Re-
spondents' counterclailn or cross-complaint (however 
viewed b~· the court) for quieting title, had been decided 
against respondents and was out of the cause when the 
case was rernanded. Consequently, it was plaintiJff's 
action and complaint, only, which was before the trial 
court for over eight years, for rendering of judgment 
in accordance with the judgment of the Suprerne Court; 
it was "plaintiff's acti,on and Complaint" only that was 
dismissed by the trial court. 
We think it is reasonable to assmne that appellant 
did not argue this point because it realized that the only 
claim that was before the trial court for the eight years 
after the prior decision by the Supreme Court, was ap-
pellant's claim of quiet title subject to the equitable duty 
to reimburse respondents. If appellant had made such 
contention, respondents could have fully briefed the mat-
ter and prevented the mistake of the court in stating 
that respondents had counterclaimed for reimbursement 
It seems apparent, therefore, that the Supreme Court's 
departure from the briefs, together with its apparent 
mistake with respect to the record, was decisive in the 
reversal of the decision of the trial court. 
POINT IV 
THE SUPREME COURT BY JUDICIAL DECISION HAS 
RENDERED RULE 41 (b) MEANINGLESS. 
Respondents subrnit that this court will agree that 
Rule 41 (b) should not be encircled by an initial judicia] 
interpretation that will render it ineffective, if not rnean-
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
----------------
ingless. Respondents respectfully submit that the court 
has, inadvertantly, by its decision in the case at bar, done 
that very thing. 
In reversing the trial court's order dismissing plain-
tiff's claim against defendants under Rule 41 (b) the 
court states: 
"Respondents further contend that Rule 41 
(b) applies to plaintiff and not defendants who 
fail to prosecute or comply with an order of the 
court and that this rule is enacted for the benefit 
of defendants to save them annoyance and harass-
ment by the plaintiffs who file suit but fail to 
prosecute them with diligence or refuse to obey 
the rules and orders of the court." 
As has been stated above, the court then goes on to 
say that Respondents contentions nright be very persua-
sive if they had not counterclaimed. The particular points 
dealing ·with respondents' counterclaim have been dealt 
with in respondents' previous points for Petition for 
Re-Hearing. 
Respondents desire to call the court's attention to its 
statement that respondents contend that the rule .. ,vas 
enacted for the benefit of defendants to saYe then1 an-
noyance and harass1nent b~- plaintiffs who file suits but 
fail to prosecute the1n." r:rhe court thereafter goes on to 
hold that defendant~ cannot reasonably argue that they 
wPre harassed and annoyed when respondents could have 
drawn and presented to the court findings and judgments 
14 
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granting them the amounts they claimed. (As respond-
ents have noted in their first grounds in the Petition for 
Re-Hearing, Respondents did not claim reimbursmnent 
in their counterclairn.) 
Respondents respectfully subrnit such ruling is un-
realistic and destructive of Rule -U (b). The purpose of 
the rule is one thing, (and of course best known by the 
Supreme Court), the prov,isions of the rule are another. 
And the rule specifically provides for dismissal, ''for 
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute" without regard to 
harassment, and this was the ground of Respondents' 
rnotion. The harassment, in this cause, was appellant's 
motions to disrniss, the antithes,is of prosecution, and 
these motions constituted a deliberate declaration that 
appellant did not desire to prosecute its claim. Conse-
quently, the harassment constituted an aggrevated vio-
lation of Rule 41 (b). 
Respondents further submit that the court's denial 
of the right of the trial court to disrniss this action be-
cause defendants "had it in their power at all times to 
obtain relief" by presenting findings and decree to the 
court for signing and because "any party to this action 
could have obtained the relief to which it was entitled 
at any time it wanted." is further destructive of Rule 
41(b). 
Let us assume for the purpose of argurnent that 
respondents could have presented findings and judgment 
15 
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providing for final judg1nent quieting title in appellant, 
subject to payment of reimbursement by appellant to 
respondents. 
It is generally true that either party (a defendant 
or plaintiff without regard to whether a counterclaim 
or cross-cmnplaint is involved) Inay push an action to 
trial and to its conclusion; and after oral announcement 
of judgnwnt is 1nade, 1nay draw and present the judg-
ment and findings to the court if the opposing party fails 
to do so. Certainly, if the power of a defendant to push 
or "prosecute" a plaintiff's claim to hearing and final 
determination, including preparation and presentation of 
an adverse judgment is to constitute a test of ·whether 
a trial court has discretion to dismiss a plaintiff's claim 
for lack of prosecution, there is little, if any, force and 
effect in Rule 41 (b). 
Further, by its interpretation, the Supre1ne Court's 
decision seems at variance with the specific language of 
the rule. The Supren1e Court ruled that respondents' 
contentions, that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion, might '"be very persuasiYe" had not the respondents 
counterclai1ned or cross-complained. The court's deci-
sion thus appears to li1nit the power of the trial court to 
dis1niss if defendant i:::~ in effect a cro:::~s-cmnplainant; or, 
as applied to the ea:::~e at bar. a di8mit'sal of the plaintiff's 
complaint for failun• to prosecute will constitute an abuse 
of discertion if defendant has cro8s-eomplained. 
16 
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This construction seerns to ignore the specific lan-
guage of the rule \vhich provides that a defendant may 
n1ove for a disn1issal of any dairn against hirn, and which 
1nakes no exception or distinction if the defendant has 
cross-complained. 
It appears to respondents that the clear intent of 
the rule is that defendant rnay move to dismiss plain-
tiff's action and cmnplaint without regard to whether de-
fendant has cross-complained. This appears clear from 
the provisions of Rule 41 (b) and (c). 
'"Rule 41 (b) Involuntary Dismissal. Effect 
Thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute 
or to comply with these rules or any order of 
court, a defendant HUl~' 1nove for dismissal of an 
action or of any claim against hirn." 
"Rule 41 (c) Dismissal of Counterclaim, Cross-
Claim, or Third-Party Claim. The provision of 
this rule apply to the dismissal of any counter-
claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim." 
Respondents submit: A trial court's power to dis-
miss for failure to prosecute is extren1ely limited if the 
filing of a cross-complaint so restricts it. 
It would appear clearly frmn the provisions of the 
rule as quoted above that a ('Olnplaint and a cross-com-
plaint must each stand on its own feet; that defendant 
may disrniss plaintiff's action and complaint if plaintiff 
faih; to prosecute; and that plaintiff might \H'll dismiss 
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defendant's cross-complaint if defendant fails to prose-
cute it. This particular point, of course, is not involved 
in the case at bar. As stated in the previous grounds 
for re-hearing, the only cause of action before the trial 
court upon remand was plaintiff's complaint and action 
for quiet title subject to the equitable duty to pay reim-
bursement. 
POINT V 
THIS DEtCISION IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW LAID 
DOWN BY THIS COURT IN PREVIOUS TAX TITLE CASES 
WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY OVERRULING THOSE CASES. 
The court says on page 3 of its opinion at the bottom 
of the first paragraph, 
"Then if appellant failed to pay these amounts 
within such reasonable time as ordered by the 
court, the court could quiet title in respondents." 
We believe that the court erroneously and inadver-
tantly made such a rule of law. Tlris matter \Yas not dis-
cussed in either Brief nor n1entioned by either counsel. 
We think that if the point had been fully briefed and 
considered by the court, that the court would have dis-
cussed the cases above cited in this Brief, and would 
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POINT VI 
RESPONDENTS COULD NOT OBTAIN THE RELIEF 
TO WHICH THEY WERE ENTITLED AND THEIR ONLY 
REMEDY WAS TO ASK FOR A DISMISSAL. 
Under the cases cited under Point I, respondents 
were not entitled to a money judgment. They were not 
entitled to have the taxes paid by thern declared a lien 
on the property. All they could do was to wait for appel-
lant to pay them. There was no affirmative action the 
respondents could take other than asking for a dismissal 
of the case. 
What are respondents' rights if the plaintiff fails 
to proceed j? Judge Wolfe sums it up in the case of 
Toronto v. Sheffield, 2:22 P. 2d 59-1 at page 601, 118 Utah 
460. 
"Where he brings the action, he asks for a 
judgment quieting title, and thus judgment nmy be 
granted on condition of his repaying the money 
paid out by the purchasers of the tax title for the 
benfit of the tax debtor owner. But even here, 
the owner may decide that he would rather forego 
his decree than pay the money and in such a case 
the purchaser of the tax title would be helpless 
when it came to obtaining recouprnent." 
On page 603 Judge Wolfe further says: 
"But if the defendant did not pay, the finding 
would repose in the records of the clerk's office 
but there would be no decree. The plaintiff could 
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not obtain a decree because it was shown that the 
defendant was really the title holder; neither 
could he obtain recoupment for the money he paid 
for the invalid tax title or such part as the de-
fendant should pay because the taxes in respect to 
which he had defaulted had by the tax title pur-
chaser in effect been paid, at least the lien for 
taxes discharged." 
We think that the court inadvertantly held and stated 
in its opinion, 
"Any party to this action could have obtained 
the relief to which it was entitled any time it 
wanted.'' 
unless the court intended by the foregoing statement to 
overrule the cases set out in Point I, and disegard and 
disagree with that which Judge Wolfe stated in the case 
of Toronto v. Sheffield, supra. 
POINT VII 
BY THE DECISION THIS COURT HAS FOR THE SEC-
OND TIME DIRECTED THE LOWER ·COURT TO DO THAT 
WHICH THIS COURT HERETOFORE ORDERED, WHICH 
ORDER WAS CARRIED OUT BY 'THE LOWER COURT BUT 
NOT COMPLIED ·wiTH BY APPELLANT. 
B~, this decision the court for the second time gives 
appellant an opportunit~· to do that whirh appellant fail-
ed and refused to do for eight years, during all of which 
tin1e respondent was obliged to keep the taxes paid on the 
property or lose his interest in the property or the right 
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to reimbursement, as wa~ held in the case of Shipp v. 
Sheffield, 117 P. 2d 996, 101 Utah 5±. In the original 
case the court directed the lower court to determine the 
amount due, which the lower court did, and which the 
appellant failed to pay but tried to avoid hy having the 
case dis1nissed and by 1naking a 1notion to quiet title with-
out reimburse1nent. Appellant has failed and refused to 
comply with that order. 
The effect of the decision of this court as herein 
handed down simply repeats that decision heretofore 
handed down by this court with the adding thereto a 
time element, failing in which the court is empowered to 
do that which Judge Hansen found should be done in 
granting respondents motion for dismissal. From that 
order this appeal was taken. 
None of the motions made by appellant prior to that 
filed after respondents' nwtion to dismiss, ever requested 
the court to permit appellant to pay the taxes. And that 
motion filed after respondents' Inotion to dismiss re-
quested nothing that had not already been detennined 
by the court when the case was remanded. 
In Bolognese v. Auder~un, 90 P. ~d 275, 97 Utah 136, 
this court held as follows: 
"So far as the tax proceedings are concerned 
we are convinced that the facts now disclosed by 
the record remain essentially the same as the)' 
appeared when the case was here before. Such 
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being the case we are precluded from again pass-
ing on a question which was presented, considered, 
and passed upon before by this court, by force of 
the doctrine of the law of the case. 5 C.J.S., Ap-
peal and Error, page 1499, 1508, 1964, and cases 
there cited. See also Forbes v. Butler, 73 rtah 
522, 275 P. 772; etah State National Bank v. Liv-
ingston, 74 Utah 456, 280 P. 327; Clark v. Los 
Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 73 l~tah 486, 275 P. 582; 
Grow v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 47 Utah 26,150 
P. 970." 
POINT VIII 
THE SUPREME COURT HAS SUBSTITUTED ITS DIS-
CRETION FOR THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
The court states that the only question to be deter-
mined is whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in dismissing the action under Rule 41 (b). But the 
court does not appear to accord the trial court's dis-
cretion the presumption of vailidity. The Supren1e Court 
does not in its opinion examine the appellant's conten-
tions as to \dl~' the trial court grossly abused its discre-
tion. The supre1ne (_ ~ourt, instead of presu1ning the valid 
exercise of discretion by the trial ronrt, appears to pre-
sume just the opposite, stating: 
"It is re .... poJI(tellt's contentions that the court 
did not abuse its discretion in disn1issing with 
prejnoi<·P appellant's action under the provisions 
of Rule 41 (b) ... etc." 
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The court then ruled against respondents' conten-
tions. It decided that the appellant should have one last 
clear chance to 1nake reimbursement; but that if appel-
lant "should fail to make such payn1ent within 30 days 
its action shall be dismissed with prejudice." 
Respondents submit: This appears to be an exer-
cise of discretion by the Supreme Court instead of ac-
ceptance of the discretion exercised by the trial court. 
Respondents further submit that it was an erroneus 
execise of discretion. It appears to provide a standard 
that before a claim may be dismissed, the plaintiff should 
be given one last clear chance to prosecute his claim. 
Such a standard appears inconsistent with the authori-
ties cited by respondents holding that activity by a plain-
tiff after a motion to disrniss has been nmde, comes too 
late. Page 13 Respondents' Brief. 
Respondents respectfully submit: The discretion 
exercised by the trial court was not an abuse of discre-
tion because in this case the appellant delayed prosecu-
tion for eight years and declared its intention not to 
prosecute by moving to dismiss its claim. Respondents 
submit that this discretion should not be disturbed by 
the Supreme Court, regardless of how the Supreme Court 
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Respondents respectfully submit that a re-hearing 
should be granted. 
Respectfully subrnitted, 
MILTON v. BACKMAN 
wILLIAM H. HENDERSON 
GOLDEN w. ROBBINS 
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